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That fateful moment in history, 7:55 AM, 7 December 1941, when the first 
Japanese bombs rained on Pearl Harbor, drastically transformed the lives of 
everyone in Hawai'i, particularly those of Japanese ancestry. 
I was awakened that morning by the constant rumbling of thunder. The 
sky toward Pearl Harbor was black with smoke, punctuated by puffs of white 
aerial bursts. "They're sure making this maneuver loolc real," I thought. 
Turning on the radio, I heard the announcer screaming, "Take cover, get off 
the streets I We are being attacked by Japanese enemy planes. This is the real 
McCoy! Take cover!" Those words pierced me like a piece of shrapnel. I was 
numb and uncomprehending. Then I heard the radio announcer say, "All 
members of the University ROTC, report to the campus immediately." I 
jumped into my ROTC uniform and rushed up to the ROTC barracks at the 
university campus. This was the first of three times that I was to volunteer my 
services during the first thirteen months of World War ll. 
Why did those of Japanese ancestry like myself volunteer for wartime 
service, one, two, and even three times during the war? To really understand 
why, you have to go back a hundred years to the beginning of Japanese 
immigration to Hawai'i. 
History of Japanese Immigration 
In 1885 the first boatload of Japanese immigrants landed in Hawai'i in 
response to the sugar industry'S need for field labor. Successful sugar culti-
vation required cheap labor, and the Hawaiian planters found the Japanese 
worker productive and industrious. Boatloads of imported immigrants from 
Japan followed, and by 1900 there were 60,000 Japanese in Hawai'i. 
Although their numbers grew, their wages were low and discriminatory. 
Portuguese and Puerto Rican workers got $22 per month, while the Japanese 
were paid only $18. A strike in 1909 was beaten down by force. Conditions 
were slow to improve. 
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Again in 1920 the Japanese sugar workers went out on a general strike 
that erupted into bitter racial hostility. The whole community was marshalled 
against the strikers. The strike for better labor conditions was pictured, not as 
an economic struggle, but as a conspiracy by Japan to take over Hawai'i. The 
sugar industry's dependence on Japanese labor notwithstanding, by sheer 
numbers--almost 40 percent of the population--the Japanese in Hawai'i had 
become an economic, politica~ and military threat to the community. 
Here's how Gavan Daws described the situation after 1900: 
The Japanese had a high birthrate, and a high birthrate meant more and 
more American citizens of Japanese ancestry. That prospect was enough to 
frighten a good many men who had a vested interest in keeping things as 
they were. Alien Japanese were manageable--,they could be prevented from 
taking out homesteads; they could be prohibited from working on territorial 
and federal construction projects; they could be barred from traveling to the 
American mainland; their language schools and their newspapers could be 
harassed; and their laborers' organizations could be beaten in any long 
strike. But what about the nisei, who might be on the verge of taking the 
advice of the Americanizers, and who would have the law behind them if 
they did? In 1920 only three voters in every hundred in the islands were 
Japanese; in 1926 it was eight in every hundred, and in 1936 it was one in 
every four. 
Was there any way to head off this apparently inexorable movement? 
The important thing was to prevent the Japanese from -taking over: 
whatever that might mean. The situation was variously described, but all the 
descriptions seemed to threaten evil. In 1920 the Japanese had to be 
controlled on the plantations; by the nineteen thirties they were loose in 
society at large, and that was a more formidable problem. If Americani-
zation did not take hold among the nisei the islands might become an 
extension of the Japanese political system in the Pacific, and that was 
unthinkable~ But if Americanization through education was successful, the 
Japanese--once Hawaii became a state--might vote together and elect a 
governor of their race, and that would be insupportable. (1974,315). 
That was a description of Hawai'i only fifty years ago. That's well within 
my lifetime! 
In the 1930s talk of statehood for Hawai'igrew, because the future of 
Hawai'i's agricultural economy depended on gaining voting representation in 
Congress. Yet Hawai'i was gripped in the schizophrenia of a Catch 22 situa-
tion because the biggest threat and obstacle to statehood was "the Japanese 
question in Hawaii": Would the Japanese in Hawai'i make good Americans? 
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The voice of opposition to statehood is well reflected by the testimony of 
one John Stokes before a Congressional joint committee in opposition to 
statehood for Hawai'i. He said: 
Ofthe original Japanese arrivals, 40,000 still remain and 110,000 oftheir 
descendants are American citizens, capable even now of dominating the 
local electorate. In view of their parents' training, characteristics, and 
background, how far may they be trUsted? 
To one who has studied Japanese and local backgrounds, it seems that 
statehood for Hawaii at the present time might become dangerous to the 
United States in the near future. At best it would be risky, so why place 
Hawaiian control in the hands of an unproven group, especially one 
descended from subjects of an aggressive and ambitious nation which at any 
moment may become an active enemy? (O~awa 1980, 262) 
That "moment" arrived most unexpectedly when the first Japanese bomb 
dropped on Pearl Harbor. That dreadful, too hortible-to-even-dream-about 
nightmare had come true. We were at war with Japan! 
That in brief is the picture of pre-Pearl Harbor Hawai'i. Now, the here-
tofore unknown, unproven, and highly doubted loyalty of the Japanese in 
Hawai'i became the BIG QUESTION MARK. Let me describe the question in 
words you can understand. In his prelude to Ambassadors mAnns (1954), a 
story of the 100th Battalion, Professor Thomas Murphy described two Amer-
ican soldiers sitting in a machine-gun pit on the north shore of O'ahu, one was 
Hawaiian and one was of Japanese ancestry. After a long silence the 
Hawaiian finally blurted out the question almost every other non-Japanese in 
Hawai'i had been burdened with. He asked: "Eh, if they come, who you going 
shoot? Dem or me?" To which the nisei soldier indignantly replied, "Who you 
think, stupid? Me just as good American as you!" This was the big question 
mark: Could those of Japanese ancestry be good loyal Americans? Professor 
Murphy wrote: "To answer and prove the question, deeds would be necessary, 
not mere words." 
The Hawai'i Terntorial Guard 
On that morning of7 December 1941, when we reported to our ROTC unit, 
there was no registration or signup, no swearing in, nor any formalities. No 
one questioned us; there were no doubts, hesitancy, or distrust. We were 
ROTC cadets responding to the call in defense of our country, just like any 
other American soldiers or sailors reporting to their battle stations. Rifles and 
real bullets were inssued. Our first mission was to deploy across Manoa 
Stream and repel Japanese paratroopers who had reportedly landed on St 
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Louis Heights. The enemy never came. This was just one of many groundless 
rumors that spread across Honolulu that day. 
That afternoon we were converted into the Hawaii Territorial Guard 
(lITG) and trucked to the National Guard Armory, where our state capitol 
building now stands. We were issued those round pie-shaped tin helmets and 
gas masks and were assigned immediately to guard the palace, the courthouse, 
the electric and telephone companies, Board of Water Supply stations and 
reselVoirs, and other utility installations around the city. Our Company B was 
stationed in the Dole cannery warehouse, where we guarded the industrial 
factories, gasoline tanks, and Honolulu harbor, armed only with puny Spring-
field .03 rifles. Fortunately no bombs dropped on the lwilei area. The enemy 
never landed. The important thing was that we had responded to our coun-
try's call to arms, we were accepted, we were proud to be in uniform, we were 
selVing our country in its hour of need~ 
Of the 500 of us in the lITG, 80 percent were of Japanese ancestry. Six 
weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, the War Department discovered to its 
horror that O'ahu was being guarded by "hundreds of Japanese" in American 
uniforms. Everyone of Japanese ancestry was discharged from the HTG on the 
morning of 19 January 1942. That discharge order was more devastating than 
if a bomb had exploded in our midst. This blow was worse than Pearl Harbor. 
To have our own country, in its danger and time of need, reject and repudiate 
our services was more than we could take. No words could ever adequately 
describe the feelings of complete rejection and repudiation we experienced 
when we were dismissed from the service of our own country, just because 
our faces and names resembled those of the enemy. The very bottom had 
dropped out of our lives. 
But that was not all. More humiliation followed. Hawai'i was gripped by a 
fear of a Japanese invasion. Other Japanese Americans already in uniform 
had their rifles taken away, and they were transferred to noncombat engineer 
units. The Draft Board reclassified all Japanese Americans from I-A draft 
status to 4-C (enemy alien) so that we were precluded from military service. 
John Balch, president of the Hawaiian Telephone Company, wrote a pam-
phlet, "Shall the Japanese Be Allowed to Dominate Hawaii?" and proposed 
all Japanese be moved to the island of Moloka'i. Secretary of the Navy Frank 
Knox pleaded with President Roosevelt for the wholesale evacuation of all 
Japanese from Hawai'i because "the military defense of Hawaii is now being 
carried out in the presence of a population predominantly with enemy sympa-
thies and affiliation." On 19 February 1942 President Roosevelt signed Execu-
tive Order 9066, which called for the evacuation of 110,000 men, women, and 
children of Japanese ancestry from the west coast and their confinement to 
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barbed-wired detention centers in inland United States. This was the situation 
facing Japanese Americans in February 1942. 
We had nothing to do but go back to the university. But education 
became meaningless. Nothing made sense. Our nation was crying for workers 
and servicemen, and yet we were deemed useless and unwanted. 
The Varsity Victory Volunteers 
One day in late January 1942, Hung Wai Ching, secretary of the university 
YMCA, talked.to a group ofHTG dischargees and persuaded them that there 
were other ways besides shooting a gun to serve their country and they ought 
to petition the military governor and ofTer themselves as a noncombat labor 
battalion. One hundred sixty-nine university boys signed a petition that was 
accepted by General Emmons. I was among those volunteers. This group was 
given the name Varsity Victory Volunteers (vvv), and we were assigned to 
the 34th Army Engineers at Schofield Barracks. We were armed, not with 
rifles, but with picks and shovels, hammers and saws, crowbars and sledge-
hammers and performed much needed defense work on O'ahu for the next 
eleven months. 
Hung Wai Ching was very proud of his VVV boys. He bragged about how 
these boys gave up their education and other lucrative defense jobs to serve 
as common laborers. One day in late December, the quarry gang breaking 
rocks up at the Kolekole Pass quarry saw Hung Wai Ching with some impor-
tant looking brass. The visitor was Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. 
Was it mere coincidence that just a few weeks later, in January 1943, the War 
Department announced the formation of an all-nisei combat team, changed 
the nisei draft status from 4-C back to I-A, and called for volunteers? 
The Triple V boys voted to disband so they could volunteer for the 442nd 
Combat Team. The Triple V had served its purpose. It had stemmed the 
rising tide of hysteria, panic, and prejudice against Hawai'i's Japanese at a 
most strategic time, and had answered the big question mark with bold, 
dramatic, and positive action, not mere words. 
The 442nd Combat Team 
The 442nd carried on where the Triple V left ofT. A call for 1500 volunteers 
from Hawai'i was made. Ten thousand Japanese Americans in Hawai'i 
responded. On the mainland more nisei volunteered from behind the barbed 
wire of detention camps. For the third time in the war I volunteered and was 
accepted to serve in the 442nd. The looth Battalion had already been sent to 
the mainland and had finished training with a distinguished record. 
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The story of the 100th and 442nd has been told and retold many times. It 
will not be retold here. The 100th and 442nd became the most decorated and 
probably the best publicized American fighting unit in World War n. Per-
sonnel of this single battle unit were awarded one Congressional Medal of 
Honor, 52 Distinguished Service Crosses, 560 Silver Stars, 5200 Bronze Stars, 
and 9486 Purple Hearts, and earned 7 Distinguished Unit citations. 
The most renowned feat of the 100th and 442nd was the heroic rescue of 
the 211 men of "The Lost Battalion," which happened in the hills of Belle-
fontaine, France, in late October 1944, at a terrible cost of 161 dead, 43 miss-
ing, and 2000 wounded. Mter the battle, on 12 November 1944, General John 
Dahlquist, commander of the 36th Division, who had ordered the rescue mis-
sion, called an assembly to honor the 100th and 442nd for their achievements. 
Seeing only a few hundred men assembled of,a regiment which normally num-
bered over 4000, General Dahlquist asked Colonel Virgil Miller with some 
irritation, "I thought I ordered the whole regiment to assemble. Where are 
the rest of the men?" To which Colonel Miller, with tears streaming down his 
cheeks, replied, "You're looking at the entire regiment, Sir. That's all that's 
left" (Stein 1985, 32; Duus 1987,217). 
The incomparable combat record of the 100th and 442nd, underscored by 
over 800 headstones for fallen comrades scattered from Italy to France, gave 
dramatic and irrefutable response to the big question mark and established 
for all time the truth of President Roosevelt's statement to the 442nd: "Amer-
icanism is not a matter of race or ancestry. Americanism is a matter of mind 
and the heart." 
The Military Intelligence Service 
A larger question still remained to be answered: "Would Americans of 
Japanese ancestry be willing to fight against the Japanese, to fight against 
those of their' own race and blood?" 
Early in the war the American military forces discovered the need for 
effective military intelligence against the Japanese. The Japanese Americans 
provided the best source of trained intelligence language specialists in the 
numbers that were needed. A military intelligence school for teaching military 
Japanese was established at Camp Savage, Minnesota, in 1942, and nisei with 
some Japanese language background were recruited from the detention 
centers, Hawai'i, the 100th Battalion, and the 442nd Combat Team. I was 
included in a group of one hundred men recruited from the 442nd in training 
at Camp Shelby. 
Mter completing a six-month crash course in military Japanese, my unit 
was assigned to the 10th Air Force in the India-Burma theater to perform 
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radio intelligence work intercepting radio transmissions of the Japanese Air 
Force in Burma. Other military intelligence graduates were assigned to the 
US Infantry, Mars Task Force, the Air Force, Marines, Navy, Paratroopers, 
ass, and OWl, and to the British, Australian, New Zealand, and Chinese 
forces operating in the Aleutian Islands, Guadalcanal, Buna, New Georgia, 
Tarawa, Leyte, the Burma Road, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima, over the entire 
Asian-Pacific theater. They translated captured documents, intercepted and 
deciphered coded messages, deciphered and translated maps, battle plans, 
military orders, diaries, and letters, and interrogated captured Japanese 
prisoners. They were the eyes and ears of Allied forces fighting the Japanese 
in the Pacific War. After the peace they served with the Japan Occupation 
Forces and the \Var Crimes Tribunals. 
In 1944 nisei interpreters translated the captured Operation Z, a Japa-
nese Navy plan for the defense of the Marianas and the Philippines. When 
the American fleet steamed into the Marianas, Admiral Spruance already 
knew the exact number and location of Japanese ships and planes, resulting in 
a decisive American victory in the battle of the Philippine Sea and Leyte 
Gulf. Nisei interpreters were instrumental in determining the location of 
Admiral Yamamoto's whereabouts, which led to the ambush of his airplane 
and his resulting death. Back in the Pentagon, Kazuo Yamane was leafing 
through some captured Japanese documents that Navy Intelligence had 
classified as "routine" (of no military value). He discovered a thick book that 
turned out to be the Imperial Army Ordinance Inventory listing the numbers 
of every type of Japanese weapon. This discovery led to new targets for B-29 
raids over Japan. 
The Japanese-American military intelligence linguist faced an added 
danger--being mistaken for the enemy and being shot at by their own troops. 
Most of them had Caucasian bodyguards. Yet some were killed by mistake. 
Sergeant Frank Hachiya of Hood River, Oregon, volunteered to parachute 
behind enemy lines in the Philippines, but as he made his way back to Ameri-
can lines, he was mistakenly shot by Americans as an enemy infiltrator. On his 
body they found maps of the complete Japanese defenses for Leyte. He was 
awarded the Distinguished Service Cross posthumously. Yet his name was 
one of the fourteen Japanese-American names removed from the War 
Memorial Honor Roll by "patriots" of the Hood River American Legion Post. 
Following a nationwide outcry the names were restored. A memorial to Frank 
Hachiya now reads: 
The life of Sgt. Hachiya symbolizes well the story of the Japanese-American 
soldiers of WW II. Unwanted by the Army, he could not be drafted. Sus-
pected by his own Government. he was confined in a relocation camp. Given 
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the most trying of assignments, to fight against those of his own ancestry and 
culture, he was mistakenly shot and killed by his own comrades. Though he 
died, his courage resulted in the saving of lives of thousands of his 
countrymen. 
During the War, over six thousand nisei served in the US Military 
Intelligence Service against the Japanese enemy, but little is known oftheir 
identity and exploits because their services were confidential and kept secret 
until their recent declassification. The nisei of the Military Intelligence Ser-
vice were the Allies' "secret weapon" in the war against Japan. General Doug-
las MacArthur stated that "Never in military history did any Army know so 
much about the enemy prior to actual engagement." General Willoughby, 
head of US Army Intelligence in the Pacific theater stated: "The nisei saved a 
million lives and shortened the war by two years." Theirs was a ringing and 
undeniable response to the question: "Who you going shoot, me or them?" 
Conclusion 
When the 100th Battalion and 442nd Combat Team returned from the 
European battlefields they were awarded a special Presidential Unit Citation 
on the White House lawn, the only American military unit to be so honored. 
Speaking for the whole nation President Harry Truman rendered the final 
verdict on the loyalty of Americans of Japanese ancestry when he said: "I 
can't tell you how much I appreciate the privilege of being able to show you 
how much the United States thinks of what you have done .... (Y]ou fougJlt 
for the free nations of the world .... (Y]ou fought not only the enemy, but 
you fought prejudice, and you won!" . 
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